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Abstract
In this paper we develop a simple economic model to analyze the use of a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint-source pollution
with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach is unsuccessful in meeting a pre-specified environmental goal. We first consider the case
where the policy is applied to a single farmer, and then extend the analysis to the
case where the policy is applied to a group of farmers. We show that in either
case such a policy can induce cost-minimizing abatement without the need for
farm-specific information. In this sense, the combined policy approach is not only
more effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach
(which does not ensure that water quality goals are met) but also less costly than
a pure ambient tax approach (since it entails lower information costs). However,
when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, we show that there is a potential
tradeoff in the design of the policy. In this context, lowering the cutoff level of pollution used for determining total tax payments increases the likely effectiveness of
the combined approach but also increases the potential for free riding. By setting
the cutoff level equal to the target level of pollution, the regulator can eliminate
free riding and ensure that cost-minimizing abatement is the unique Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily. However, this cutoff level also
ensures that zero voluntary abatement is a Nash equilibrium. In addition, with
this cutoff level the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily will not
strictly dominate the equilibrium under which it is not. We show that all results
still hold if the background threat instead takes the form of reducing government
subsidies if a pre-specified environmental goal is not met.
Keywords: ambient taxes, nonpoint-source pollution control, cost-minimizing
abatement, voluntary approach

Voluntary Approaches to Nonpoint Pollution Control:
Inducing First-best Outcomes through the Use of Threats
I. INTRODUCTION
While concerns about pollution control originally focused on point sources of pollution,
attention has now turned to the control of diffuse or nonpoint-source pollution (NPP).1 Control
of NPP is hampered by the fact that emissions of pollutants are not readily observable given their
diffuse nature, which implies that traditional policy instruments based on emissions (e.g.,
emissions taxes or regulation) cannot be used in this context. This has lead economists to
consider alternative policy instruments for the control of NPP, including input taxes, input
regulations, ambient taxes, random fines, and type-specific contracts (Griffin and Bromley 1982;
Shortle and Dunn 1986; Segerson 1988, Xepapadeas 1991, 1992, 1995; Cabe and Herriges 1992;
Herriges et al. 1994; Govindasamy et al. 1994; and Shortle and Abler 1994). Instruments that
provide flexible incentives (such as ambient taxes) can be used to induce first-best control of
NPP (Segerson 1988), but information about farm-level charactertistics is needed to design these
first-best policy instruments. They have thus been criticized as being likely to involve high
information and/or transactions costs (e.g., Cabe and Herriges 1992; Batie and Ervin 1997). This
has led some to suggest the use of second best policy instruments instead (Helfand and House
1995; Wu and Babcock 1995, 1996; Wu, et al. 1995). Use of these second best instruments
involves a tradeoff. While transaction and information costs may be lower, these instruments do
not achieve the targeted water quality level at the minimum abatement cost.
In contrast to the theoretical literature of NPP, water quality policy has historically been
based on the use of "carrot" instruments designed to entice farmers to use environmentallyfriendly practices voluntarily or to participate in voluntary programs aimed at improving water
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quality.2 However, the varying success rates of voluntary programs have led some to question
whether reliance on voluntary measures alone will adequately control agricultural pollution
(Ribaudo and Caswell 1997), suggesting the need for mandatory controls or incentives to ensure
adequate environmental protection. Yet, as noted above, mandatory controls3 generally have
drawbacks in terms of inflexibility (in the case of second-best instruments) or high transaction or
information costs (for first-best instruments). Thus, neither purely voluntary programs nor
mandatory approaches by themselves seem to offer a desirable "solution" to agricultural NPP.
There is, however, an alternative role for voluntary and mandatory approaches to NPP,
namely, as complementary instruments to be used together rather than as substitutes to be used in
isolation. As has become apparent in the context of point source pollution, the threat of the
imposition of mandatory controls can be an effective mechanism for inducing firms to participate
in voluntary agreements (Segerson and Miceli 1998), while voluntary approaches have the
potential to provide greater flexibility in meeting environmental quality goals and hence lower
compliance and transaction costs (Commission of the European Communities 1996).
A few states have experimented with the use of mandatory approaches as threats to be
invoked if reliance on voluntary measures is insufficient to control nonpoint source pollution,
and the threat of regulation has been shown to create an incentive for farmers to alter their
production practices (Ribaudo and Caswell 1997). Yet to date the economic literature on NPP
has not considered the possible use of both voluntary and mandatory approaches as
complementary parts of a policy package. Segerson and Miceli (1998) develop a model of this
type in the context of point source pollution, where the regulator negotiates with an individual
firm (or an industry representative) over the level of abatement under the agreement. Their focus
is on the negotiated level of abatement that emerges under the agreement. They do not consider
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an approach under which the regulator sets an environmental quality target and then seeks
participation in a program to achieve that target, as is typical in the case of NPP. Dawson and
Segerson (2002) examine the use of industry-wide threats to induce participation in voluntary
approaches, but again the context is point source pollution where the threat is an emissions tax (a
policy instrument that is not feasible in the context of NPP). Wu and Babcock (1999) compare
the relative efficiency of voluntary and mandatory approaches to NPP, but they treat the two as
alternatives and do not consider a policy package under which the two are combined.
In this paper we develop a simple economic model to analyze the use of a policy that
combines a voluntary approach to controlling nonpoint-source pollution with a background
threat of an ambient tax (or losing government subsidies) if the voluntary approach is
unsuccessful in meeting a pre-specified environmental goal. We use the model to examine
whether the regulator can use such a policy to solve free-rider problems and to induce costminimizing abatement decisions without the need for farm-specific information about pollutionrelated characteristics. We first consider how a single farmer would respond to such a combined
policy. We consider both a static model, in which imposition of the threat can occur
instantaneously when the target is not met, and a dynamic model, in which there is a lag between
failure to meet the goal and imposition of the threat. We then extend the analysis to the case
where the policy is applied to a group of farms. In this context, we ask whether cost-minimizing
abatement decisions are a Nash equilibrium.
We show that, in both the case where the policy is applied to a single farmer and where it
is applied to a group of farmers, such a policy can induce cost-minimizing abatement without the
need for farm-specific information. In this sense, the combined approach can be both more
effective than a purely voluntary approach and involve lower information or transaction costs
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than a pure tax approach. However, when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, we show
that there is a potential tradeoff in the design of the policy. Lowering the cutoff level of
pollution used for determining total tax payments increases the likely effectiveness of the
combined approach but, when applied to a group of farmers, it also increases the potential for
free riding. While the cutoff level can be set to eliminate free riding and ensure that costminimizing abatement is a unique Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily,
this level will also make the farmers indifferent between meeting the target voluntarily and
facing the ambient tax. While we derive the results assuming the regulator threatens imposition
of an ambient tax, all of our results still hold if the background threat instead takes the form of
reducing government subsidies if a pre-specified environmental goal is not met.
II. SINGLE POLLUTER CASE
We consider first the case of a single farmer whose agricultural activities pollute a nearby
waterbody. The farmer can engage in abatement practices, such as the use of reduced tillage,
establishment of buffer strips, construction of manure storage facilities, and land retirement, to
reduce water pollution, or, equivalently, to increase ambient water quality in the waterbody.
Expected ambient pollution in the waterbody, denoted x, is a function of the farmer’s pollution
abatement practices, denoted a = (a1 , a 2 ,..., a m ) , and the physical characteristics of the farm
(e.g., the steepness of the fields and/or the proximity to the waterbody), denoted θ. Thus,
x=x(a,θ), where ∂x/∂ai≤ 0 and ∂x/∂θ ≥ 0.4 We assume that, although each farmer knows his or
her own θ, the regulator knows only the distribution of θ. The cost of abatement, denoted C,
depends on both the abatement efforts and the physical characteristics of the farm, i.e.,
C=C(a,θ), where ∂C/∂ai≥0 for all i. For example, the cost of establishing riparian buffer strips
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depends not only on the establishment cost (e.g., fencing cost) but also on the land quality, which
determines the opportunity cost of the land taken out of production.5
We assume that there is some exogenously set target level of water quality determined by
a criterion such as "fishable and swimmable" or by the level necessary to support some desirable
activity (e.g., salmon spawning). This requires that ambient pollution not exceed an exogenous
standard, xs. The regulator takes this standard as given and tries to design a policy to ensure that
this standard is met at least cost.6 A good example is the Total Maximum Daily Loads (TMDLs),
mandated by Section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act. A TMDL is a water quality standard that
establishes the maximum amount of pollution that a watershed can assimilate without violating
state water quality standards.
The cost-minimizing abatement vector, denoted a*=a*(xs,θ), solves
(1)

C(a, θ)

minimize

subject to x(a, θ) ≤ xs.
a ≥ 0.
The necessary first-order conditions require that at a*(xs, θ):
(2)

∂C/∂ai +λ*(xs,θ) ∂x/∂ai ≥ 0

where λ*(xs,θ) is the optimal value of the Lagrangian multiplier. These conditions are also
sufficient, under the appropriate curvature assumptions. Then C*≡C*(xs,θ)=C(a*(xs,θ), θ) is the
minimum cost of meeting the standard, where ∂ C * ∂ xs < 0 .
We consider the following policy scenario. The regulator agrees to give the farmer a
chance to meet the standard voluntarily. If the standard is met, no further policy is imposed.
However, if the standard is not met, the regulator will impose an ambient tax, with the magnitude
of the tax set at the level sufficient to induce the farmer to choose an abatement vector that
5

ensures that the standard will be met. Imposition of the tax requires that the regulator spend the
resources necessary to learn θ, since the magnitude of the tax necessary to ensure that the target
is met depends on θ. However, since the farmer knows his own θ, he can anticipate the
magnitude of the tax that the regulator will impose if the voluntary approach fails. In this section
we assume that the regulator can instantaneously observe whether the standard has been met and
impose the tax if necessary. In Section III, we consider an extended dynamic model in which
imposition of a tax follows in a subsequent period.
Formally, under the above policy, the farmer faces the following policy-related costs:

(3)

if x(av ,θ ) ≤ xs

0
T =
t ( x(at ,θ ) − x )

if x(av ,θ ) > xs

where av is the announced or intended abatement vector under the voluntary program, at is the
abatement vector that is chosen if the tax is imposed, t is the ambient tax rate, and x ≤ xs is a
“cutoff level” of pollution.7 Note that this policy is analytically similar to the pure ambient
tax/subsidy policy considered in Segerson (1988).8 Under both policies, if ambient pollution
exceeds a given target, a tax is imposed on the amount by which the ambient level exceeds a
given cutoff level. However, in Segerson (1988), the target level (xs) and the cutoff level ( x )
are the same. Under the voluntary approach proposed here, we allow the two to differ. The
importance of this is discussed in detail below. Another difference between the two policies
arises when pollution is below the target. The voluntary approach acts like a pure tax policy, in
that the farmer receives (and pays) nothing when the target is met, i.e., when ambient pollution is
at or below the target level. In contrast, under the ambient tax/subsidy policy, the farmer
receives a subsidy proportional to the amount by which pollution is below the target.9
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We begin by establishing that, when facing the above policy, meeting the standard in the
least cost way is an optimal response for the farmer.

PROPOSITION 1: If t = λ*(xs,θ), then (i) the cost-minimizing abatement vector is an optimal
voluntary abatement vector, i.e., a*∈ argmin Cv, where Cv is the farmer’s cost under the above
policy. Furthermore, (ii) if x < x s , then a* is the unique optimal voluntary abatement vector,
while if x = x s , then 0∈ argmin Cv as well. (iii) The pollution standard will be met at minimum
cost for any x .
PROOF: The farmer’s choice of av determines whether or not the tax is imposed. Faced with the
tax, the farmer will choose at to minimize C (at ,θ ) + t ( x(at ,θ ) − x ) . The first-order conditions is
then
∂C/∂ai +t⋅ ∂x/∂ai ≥ 0.
If t = λ*(xs,θ), the solution is at*= a*(xs,θ), and the corresponding total cost is C * +t ⋅ ( x s − x ) .
Given this, when choosing av, the farmer faces the following costs:
C (av ,θ )
Cv = 
C * +t ( xs − x )

if x(av ,θ ) ≤ xs
if x(av ,θ ) > xs

The results in the proposition then follow directly.
Proposition 1 implies that the combined policy can induce cost-minimizing voluntary
abatement regardless of the level of x . If x < x s , the farmer will strictly prefer to meet the
standard voluntarily (at minimum cost), while if x = x s , he will be indifferent between meeting
it voluntarily and choosing an abatement vector that triggers the tax.
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Figure 1 illustrates the results in Proposition 1 for the case where a is a scalar and x < x s .
The dashed curve is the cost function that the farmer faces under the combined policy. If the
farmer’s abatement level is greater than or equal to a*, he will face no tax, and the farmer’s total
cost is simply C(av,θ). However, if his abatement level is lower then a*, the standard will not be
met voluntarily, and a tax will be imposed. If t = λ*(xs,θ), the farmer will choose the costminimizing abatement level and his total cost is then C * +t ⋅ ( x s − x ) . It is clear from Figure 1
that over the entire domain the farmer’s total costs are minimized at a*. Note that the
discontinuity in the farmer’s total costs stems from the assumption that x < x s . If x = x s , the
discontinuity is eliminated. Even without this discontinuity, the farmer’s total cost is still
minimized (although not uniquely) at a*. Thus, the cost-minimizing abatement level minimizes
the farmer’s cost regardless of the value of x .
Proposition 1 shows that for any cutoff level the standard will be met at minimum cost.
However, this does not mean that the choice of x is unimportant. In Segerson (1988), the cutoff
level of pollution x was one key parameter that the regulator could choose to ensure efficient
exit/entry conditions and industry size. Here it plays a very different role. Although in
equilibrium the water quality target can be met at minimum cost for any x , when x <xs, the
farmer’s cost if he meets the target voluntarily will be strictly lower than his cost if he meets it
only after the tax has been imposed. The farmer’s total cost under the tax serves as a reservation
cost that defines a maximum amount of abatement (if abatement is a scalar) or an abatement
vector that the farmer would be willing to undertake voluntarily, a max , given by
(4)

C( a max ,θ) ≡ C*+t⋅( xs - x ).

Note that in the scalar case a max > a*, i.e., the maximum amount of abatement the farmer would
be willing to undertake voluntarily exceeds the cost-minimizing level if xs > x . Thus, while the
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farmer’s optimal choice is still a*, when x < x s the farmer would actually be willing to undertake
more abatement to avoid payment of the tax.10
However, if the regulator sets x =xs, the farmer’s costs are not strictly lower if the
standard is met voluntarily (i.e., the discontinuity in Figure 1 is eliminated) and in the scalar case
a max = a*. In this case, the farmer is indifferent between meeting the standard voluntarily and
having the tax imposed, and has no incentive to undertake more abatement voluntarily than he
would undertake if he had to pay the tax. In other words, the tax is no longer a real threat to the
farmer, since it imposes no costs above and beyond what he would incur if he met the target
voluntarily.
In sum, in the single farmer case, combining the voluntary approach and the ambient tax
(i.e., treating them as complements in a policy package rather than as substitute policies) can
ensure that the target is met at minimum cost without incurring the potentially high information
costs necessary for imposing an ambient tax. If x < x s , this is the unique equilibrium outcome
under the combined policy. In this case, the tax is never actually imposed because the threat of
imposition of the tax is sufficient to induce voluntary compliance. As a result, the regulator does
not need to incur the costs of learning θ. Thus, the combined policy approach is not only more
effective in protecting environmental quality than a pure voluntary approach (which does not
ensure that water quality goals are met) but also less costly than a pure ambient tax approach
(since it entails lower information costs). If x = x s , cost-minimizing voluntary abatement is still
an equilibrium outcome, but the farmer no longer strictly prefers this to the outcome under which
the tax is imposed. This suggests that in designing the policy, the regulator should set x < x s .
We show below that this conclusion continues to hold when the single farmer model is extended
to incorporate a more explicit and realistic timing of possible imposition of the tax. However,
9

we show that, when extended to apply to a group of farmers, setting x < x s can induce an
allocation inefficiency.

III. AN EXTENSION TO A DYNAMIC MODEL
The above model assumes that the regulator can observe instantaneously whether the
target has been met voluntarily and immediately impose the tax if it has not. In this section, we
present an extended model that incorporates a more explicit and realistic timing of events. We
show that, when x < x s , the result from the static model presented in the previous section
continues to hold in this context, provided the discount rate is sufficiently low relative to the
difference between xs and x .11 However, when x = x s , the farmer will strictly prefer not to
meet the standard voluntarily. This is in contrast to the result in the static model, where the
farmer was indifferent between meeting it voluntarily and facing the tax when x = x s .
We view the problem as an infinitely repeated game between the regulator and the
farmer. During each time period the farmer chooses an abatement level, which determines
whether or not the standard will be met in that period. There is no “carry over” effect of
pollution abatement. At the end of each period, the regulator observes whether the standard has
been met during that period. The regulator then plays the following trigger strategy. No tax is
imposed during the first period. If during that period the regulator observes that the water
quality standard has been met voluntarily, she does not impose any tax in the following period
and the game is repeated. However, if during that period (or any subsequent period in which a
tax has not been imposed) she observes that the standard has not been met voluntarily, then she
expends the resources necessary to learn θ and imposes a tax equal to λ*(xs,θ) for all of the
remaining periods.
10

Consider the farmer’s first-period choice. If the farmer chooses not to meet the target
voluntarily in the first period, then the present value of the stream of total costs will be
[C*+t⋅(xs- x )]⋅(δ + δ2 + δ3 + …) = [C*+t⋅(xs- x )]⋅ [δ/(1-δ)],

(5)

where δ=1/(1+r) is the discount factor and r is the discount rate. Suppose instead the farmer
chooses to meet the target voluntarily in the first period, with the corresponding cost of C*.
Then the regulator will not impose the tax, and at the beginning of the second period the farmer
will face the same decision (and possible payoffs) that he faced at the beginning of the first
period. If meeting the target is optimal for the first period, then it will be optimal for the second
period and all subsequent periods as well. Let V denote the present value of the infinite stream
of costs incurred from making this choice optimally now and every time it arises in the future.
Then
V = C* + δV,

(6)
which implies that
(7)

V=C*/(1-δ)=C*⋅(1 + δ + δ2 + …).

Comparing the present values in (5) and (7) yields the following result.

PROPOSITION 2: Suppose the regulator employs a trigger strategy whereby he does not impose
an ambient tax initially and then imposes a (permanent) ambient tax in period T if and only if the
water quality target was not met in period T-1. Then the farmer’s optimal response is to meet
the target voluntarily in each period if and only if r<t⋅(xs- x )/C*.

Proposition 2 states that meeting the target voluntarily will be optimal for the farmer if
and only if the discount rate is sufficiently low. Rewriting this condition as C* < t(xs- x )/r
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provides the intuition for this result: the farmer will meet the target voluntarily provided the
gain from avoiding abatement in the first period C* is less than the present value of the stream of
tax payments the farmer would incur by triggering imposition of the tax (t(xs- x )/r). Clearly, this
condition will never be met for any positive discount rate if x = x s . In this case, even if the tax
is subsequently imposed in response to failure to meet the target in the previous period, as long
as the target is subsequently met, there will be no net tax payments under the tax. Thus, even
under the trigger strategy, with x = x s the farmer is effectively given a new opportunity to meet
the standard in each period. This eliminates any opportunity to “punish” the farmer for failure to
meet the standard in a previous period. Thus, with x = x s it is optimal for the farmer to take
advantage of the first period reprieve and then meet the standard in all subsequent periods,
regardless of his discount rate. This follows provided that the tax is based on ambient pollution
in the period in which it is imposed. If the tax is based on the ambient pollution in the previous
period, i.e., if it is applied retroactively, the regulator would have the ability to punish firstperiod non-compliance. Note that if the regulator had not offered the voluntary approach but had
instead simply imposed an ambient tax in all periods, farmers would faced net tax payments for
any period in which the target was not met. In this sense, if x = x s , use of a pure ambient tax
would lead to greater environmental protection than use of the voluntary approach, which allows
the farmer to postpone abatement for one period at no cost.
However, if x < x s , it is optimal for the farmer to meet the standard voluntarily in all
periods, provided his discount rate is low enough. In this case, if the farmer fails to meet the
standard voluntarily in a given period, he will face a positive tax payment in all future periods
even if he subsequently meets the standard in all future periods. Thus, with x < x s , the farmer is
not given a second chance to meet the target at no additional cost (i.e., no cost in addition to the
12

cost of abatement). As a result, by setting x < x s the regulator can induce voluntary compliance
in all periods as long as the discount rate and/or x is sufficiently low. Thus, in contrast to the
static model, in this dynamic context, cost-minimizing abatement is not an optimal voluntary
abatement vector for all x . Nonetheless, the results here confirm the result from the static
model that the policy is more likely to induce voluntary cost-minimizing abatement if the
regulator sets x < x s .

IV. MULTIPLE FARMERS
While the single-farm case provides a benchmark for the study of the combined policy
approach, in many contexts there are likely to be several farms whose activities contribute to
ambient water pollution in a neighboring lake or stream. We show in this section that a
voluntary program coupled with a background threat of an ambient tax can induce costminimizing abatement decisions in this context as well. More specifically, we show that under
the appropriate design of the ambient tax cost-minimizing voluntary abatement by all farmers is
a Nash equilibrium. However, consistent with the results from the static model of a single
farmer, whether this equilibrium is unique or not depends on the relative magnitudes of xs and
x . In particular, we show that, when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, there is a
fundamental tradeoff in setting the magnitudes of xs and x between creating incentives for
voluntary abatement and inducing free-riding by some farmers.
In this extension of the model, we assume that there are n farms and each farmer knows
his own type (θj) and the other farmers’ types.12 The expected ambient water pollution is then
x=x(a1, a2, …, an; θ1, θ2 , …, θn). For simplicity, we assume that each farmer’s abatement choice
is a scalar, and that the regulator can observe instantaneously whether the target has been met

13

voluntarily and immediately impose the tax if it has not. As before, the objective of the regulator
is to meet an exogenously set water quality standard at minimum cost. The cost-minimizing
abatement choices {aj*(θ1, θ2 , …, θn, xs), j = 1, 2, …, n} solve13
(8)

minimize C(a1, θ1) + C(a2, θ2) +…+C(an, θn)

(9)

subject to x(a1, a2, …, an; θ1, θ2 , …, θn)≤ xs .

The necessary first order conditions are
(10)

∂C/∂aj + λ*(xs, θ1, θ2 , …, θn)⋅(∂x/∂aj)≥ 0, for all j

where λ*(xs, θ1, θ2 , …, θn) is the optimal value of the Lagrangian multiplier. Let Cj* ≡ C(aj*(θ1,
θ2 , …, θn,xs), θj) be the corresponding abatement cost for farmer j.
As before, we assume that the regulator imposes an ambient tax if and only if the water
quality target is not met voluntarily. All farmers with potential contributions to the waterbody
would be subject to the tax. If the tax is imposed, each farmer chooses his abatement level to
minimize C(aj,θj)+t⋅[x(a1, a2, …, an; θ1, θ2 , …, θn) - x ]. If the regulator sets t= λ*(xs, θ1, θ2 ,
…, θn), then under the tax each farmer will choose the cost-minimizing abatement level aj*(θ1, θ2
, …, θn,xs), if he believes that other farmers will do the same, i.e., cost-minimizing abatement is a
Nash equilibrium under the ambient tax. 14 The corresponding cost for farmer j is then
Cj*+t⋅(xs- x ). This represents farmer j’s reservation cost. Farmer j will not voluntarily undertake
abatement that generates costs in excess of Cj*+t⋅(xs- x ); if costs under voluntary compliance
exceed Cj*+t⋅(xs- x ), the farmer would be better off if the target is not met and the ambient tax is
imposed. This reservation cost thus defines a maximum amount of abatement that farmer j
would be willing to undertake voluntarily, a max
, given by
j
(11)

C( a max
,θj) ≡ Cj*+t⋅(xs- x ).
j
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Note that a max
> aj*(θ1, θ2 , …, θn, xs) if xs> x , i.e., the maximum amount of abatement farmer j
j
would be willing to undertake voluntarily exceeds the cost-minimizing level. From (11), it
follows that
∂a max
j

(12)

∂x

=-

t
< 0.
Ca j

This implies that an increase in the cutoff level of pollution will reduce the maximum amount of
abatement each farmer is willing to undertake. Similarly, under the assumption that Ca j a j < 0 and
xa j a j < 0 , we can show that
∂a max
j

(13)

∂xs

(

1
=
Ca j

ˆ
xa j lx*s
Ê ∂a*j ˆ
1 Ê
t
+
=
t
Á
˜ >0,
Á ∂x ˜ C
Ca j a j + l * xa j a j ¯
Ë
s ¯
aj Ë

)

where lx*s = ∂ C1* + ... + Cn* ∂xs < 0 and xa j < 0 . This implies that reducing the water quality
standard would increase the maximum amount of abatement each farmer is willing to undertake
voluntarily. With a lower water quality standard, the cost the farmer would face under the tax is
greater. Thus, he is willing to undertake more voluntary abatement in order to avoid imposition
of the tax.
We can now characterize the abatement levels that constitute Nash equilibria under a
policy where the regulator imposes an ambient tax if and only if the water quality target is not
met voluntarily.

PROPOSITION 3: The abatement levels (a1v , a2 v ,..., anv ) are a Nash equilibrium under which the
water quality target is met voluntarily if and only if they satisfy
(i)

a jv £ a max
for all j, and
j
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(ii)

x (a1v , a2 v ,..., anv ; q 1 , q 2 ,...,q n ) = xs .

PROOF: By the definition of a max
, as long as a jv £ a max
, farmer j would incur lower costs by
j
j
choosing this abatement level than by facing the tax if this abatement level ensured that the water
quality target is met voluntarily. Let a − j = (a1v ,..., a j −1v , a j +1v ,..., a nv ) be the voluntary abatement
choices of all farmers other than farmer j. Suppose there exists an ajv (denoted a j ' ) such that
(a j ' , a − j ) satisfies (i) and (ii). Then a j ' is a best response to a − j . Clearly, farmer j would not
choose a level of abatement greater than this a j ', since doing so would increase his cost.
Similarly, choosing an abatement level lower than a j ' would result in failure of the voluntary
approach and imposition of the tax.

Because a j ' ≤ a j

max

, the cost from choosing a j ' can be no

higher than the cost from choosing any level of abatement that results in imposition of the tax.
Hence, the farmer can do no better (and will possibly be worse off) by choosing any abatement
level less than a j ' . Thus, any combination of (a1v, a2v,…, anv) satisfying (i) and (ii) is a Nash
equilibrium. Conversely, any Nash equilibrium under which the water quality target is met
voluntarily must satisfy (i) since otherwise some farmers would prefer the tax. It also must
satisfy (ii) because if x>xs , the water quality standard is not met; and if x<xs, then given the
abatement levels of all other farmers, some farmer could incur lower costs by reducing his
abatement to the level where x=xs . Q.E.D.
Because {aj*(θ1, θ2 , …, θn, xs), j = 1, 2, …, n} satisfies both conditions in Proposition 3,
the following proposition follows immediately:
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PROPOSITION 4: The cost-minimizing abatement levels {aj*(θ1, θ2 , …, θn, xs), j = 1, 2, …, n} are
a Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily for any level of x .

This result implies that under the voluntary approach it is optimal for each farmer to
undertake the cost-minimizing abatement, as long as he believes other farmers are doing so.
Thus, cost-minimizing abatement is a Nash equilibrium. In this case, as in the single farmer
model, for any level of x , by providing farmers the opportunity to meet the target voluntarily,
the regulator can achieve cost-minimizing abatement without incurring the information costs that
would be associated with reliance solely on an ambient tax.
In contrast to the result in the single farmer model, with multiple farmers costminimizing voluntary abatement is never a unique equilibrium. If xs> x , there are other Nash
equilibria under which the target is met voluntarily (but not at minimum cost). For example, in
the case of two farms, as long as x(0, a2max ;θ1, θ2) = xs, (0, a2max ) is also a Nash equilibrium but it
does not minimize the total abatement cost. In this case, farmer 2 would face a higher cost under
the tax than he would incur by achieving the water quality standard by himself. Realizing this,
farmer 1 would free ride on farmer 2’s effort. Because of the free rider problem, aggregate
abatement costs are higher than they would have been under a pure ambient tax, since the
allocation of abatement across farms is inefficient.15
In addition, under some circumstances, zero voluntary abatement may also be a Nash
equilibrium.
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PROPOSITION 5: Let a sj be implicitly defined by x (0,...0, a sj ,0,...0; q 1 ,q 2 ,...q n ) = xs . Then zero
x
voluntary abatement (a1v = 0, a2 v = 0,..., anv = 0) is a Nash equilibrium if a sj > a ma
for j=1,2, …,
j

n.

Proposition 5 states that, if all farmers would incur higher costs by meeting the target on
their own than they would incur under the ambient tax, i.e., if no farm is willing to meet the
target on its own, then an outcome under which no farmer abates voluntarily is a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, it is possible that in equilibrium the water quality target will not be met
voluntarily and the ambient tax will be imposed. Note, however, that provided x < x s , the
outcome under which each voluntarily chooses his cost-minimizing abatement aj* always strictly
dominates the zero voluntary abatement equilibrium since it yields lower total costs for all
farmers. Hence, if farmers are able to engage in "cheap talk," (see Rasmusen 1994) i.e., to
communicate about their abatement plans (as would be expected in relatively small watersheds
where farmers are neighbors), we would not expect the zero voluntary abatement outcome to
emerge as the equilibrium when x < x s .
The above results suggest that when x < x s there will be Nash equilibria under which the
target is met voluntarily but not at least cost because of free-riding. Free-riding can be avoided
by setting xs= x . However, setting x = x s also ensures that zero voluntary abatement is a Nash
equilibrium.

PROPOSITION 6. If xs= x , zero voluntary abatement by all farmers (a1v = 0, a2 v = 0,..., anv = 0) is
a Nash equilibrium.
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Proof: Let xs= x , and suppose a − j = (0,...,0) . If farmer j set a vj = 0 , the tax will be imposed
and farmer j will incur a cost of Cj*.

Any other choice of avj will yield a cost at least as high as

Cj*. Thus, zero abatement by all farmers is a Nash equilibrium. QED
Note that when xs= x , the Nash equilibria include cost-minimizing abatement by all
farmers and zero abatement by all farmers. Neither equilibrium involves free-riding and both
lead to the outcome under which farmers meet the target at minimum cost. As a result, the cost
to each farmer will be the same under the two equilibria, implying that all farmers are indifferent
between them. Thus, there is no a priori reason to expect one equilibrium (for example, the
equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily) to be more likely than the other.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of the cut-off level of pollution on the tradeoff between
free-rider problems and the possibility that the environmental standard is not met voluntarily. As
shown in Proposition 3, all (a1 , a2 ) combinations that satisfy a1 £ a1max , a2 £ a2max , and
x( a1 , a2 ) = xs are Nash equilibria under which the water quality standard is met voluntarily.
These combinations are shown by the segment AB on the water quality constraint curve
x( a1 , a2 ) = xs in Figure 2a for the case where the cutoff level of pollution is set below the
pollution standard. Among these combinations, only (a1* , a2* ) minimizes total costs, C1 + C2 . All
other combinations imply an inefficient allocation of abatement across farmers.
With an increase in the cutoff level of pollution, the maximum abatement each farmer is
, decreases (see (12)). As a result, the set of Nash equilibria under
willing to undertake, a max
j
which the water quality standard is met voluntarily shrinks. When the cutoff level of pollution is
set equal to the pollution standard, the maximum abatement each farmer is willing to undertake
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a max
reduces to the cost-minimizing abatement level, the set of Nash equilibria under which the
j
water quality standard is met voluntarily shrinks to a single (unique) point (point A in figure 2b),
and the free rider problem is eliminated. Thus, in contrast to Segerson (1988) where the
regulator chooses the cutoff level of pollution x to ensure efficient exit/entry conditions and
industry size, here the regulator can choose x to eliminate or reduce the free-rider problem.
Fully eliminating the free-rider problem by setting x s = x involves a trade-off, however.
When x s = x , by Proposition 6 zero voluntary abatement is also a Nash equilibrium. As noted
above, as long as x < xs , all Nash equilibria under which the water quality standard is met
voluntarily (i.e., those located on the segment AB in figure 2a) strictly dominate those where
voluntary abatement is zero. Since the farmers pay no tax when the standard is met voluntarily,
the corresponding Nash equilibria yield lower costs for all farmers than under the equilibrium
where the tax is imposed. Thus the farmers collectively and individually strictly prefer to meet
the standard voluntarily. However, if x s = x so that the free rider problem is eliminated, the
Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily no longer strictly dominates the zero
voluntary abatement equilibrium, i.e., the strict preference for voluntary abatement is eliminated.
Farmers now become individually and collectively indifferent between meeting the standard
voluntarily and having the tax imposed, implying that success of the voluntary program is no
longer a dominating equilibrium.

Thus, by setting x < x s , the regulator increases the

likelihood that the farmers will meet the target voluntarily and hence that the transaction costs
associated with imposition of the tax will be avoided (as in the single farmer case), but at the
cost of a decrease in allocative efficiency (i.e., an increase in the total abatement costs).
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V. REDUCTION OF GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES
The analysis above assumes that the background threat takes the form of an ambient tax.
However, agricultural water quality policy in the United States has historically been based on the
use of “carrot” approaches designed to entice farmers to use environmentally friendly practices
voluntarily through the use of government subsidies.16 Such a policy can also be used with a
background threat to achieve environmental goals at minimum costs. Instead of imposing an
ambient tax, the background threat could be a reduction in government subsidies if a prespecified environmental standard is not met. Specifically, under such a policy, the regulator
would agree to give the farmer a chance to meet the standard voluntarily. If the standard is met,
a pre-specified level of government subsidy would be paid. However, if the standard is not met
voluntarily, the regulator would reduce the subsidy, with the magnitude of the reduction set at
the level sufficient to induce the farmer to choose an abatement vector that ensures that the
standard would be met. Formally, under the above policy, the farmer would face the following
policy-related benefits:
if x (av ,θ ) ≤ xs

 S0
S =
 S 0 − t ( x ( as , θ ) − x )

if x(av ,θ ) > xs

where S o is the pre-specified fixed subsidy, and a s is the abatement level the farmer chooses
when facing a threat of losing government subsidies. It can be shown that the results derived
above under the assumption that the regulator threatens imposition of an ambient tax would hold
as well if the regulator threatens instead to reduce government subsidies as specified above.17

VI. CONCLUSIONS
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Although the economic literature of NPP has focused on mandatory or stick approaches
(e.g., input use taxes or restrictions), water quality policies in the U.S. have historically been
based on the use of carrot instruments designed to entice farmers to adopt conservation practices
voluntarily. Both the mandatory and voluntary approaches have been criticized in the economic
literature. Mandatory approaches generally have drawbacks in terms of inflexibility or high
transaction or information costs, while voluntary approaches may fail to provide adequate
environmental protection. Thus, neither a purely voluntary program nor a purely mandatory
approach seems to offer a desirable solution to agricultural NPP.
In this paper we examine a policy that combines a voluntary approach to controlling
nonpoint-source pollution with a background threat of an ambient tax if the voluntary approach
is unsuccessful in meeting a pre-specified environmental goal. In particular, we use the model to
examine whether the regulator can use such a policy to induce cost-minimizing abatement
decisions without the need for farm-specific information about pollution-related characteristics.
We first consider how a single farmer would respond to such a combined policy, and then extend
the analysis to consider multiple farmers. In the context of multiple farmers, we ask whether
cost-minimizing abatement decisions are a Nash equilibrium and whether the proposed approach
leads to free-riding by some farmers. We consider both a static model, in which imposition of
the threat can occur instantaneously when the target is not met, and a dynamic model, in which
there is a one-period lag between failure to meet the goal and imposition of the threat. While we
derive the results in the context where the background threat is a tax, the results would also hold
if the background threat were instead a reduction in government subsidies.
The main results can be summarized as follows. Combining a voluntary approach with a
background threat of an ambient tax (or a reduction in government subsidies) can induce cost-
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minimizing abatement without the need for farm-specific information about pollution-related
characteristics. This policy can therefore be both more effective than a pure voluntary approach
without a threat (which might not ensure adequate environmental protection) and involve lower
information or transaction costs than a pure ambient tax policy (since the regulator does not have
to expend the resources to learn the site characteristics of the farm).
The ability of the policy to induce voluntary cost-minimizing abatement without the need
for site-specific information holds in the context of either a single farmer or multiple farmers. In
the single farmer case with an instantaneous threat, voluntary cost-minimizing abatement is an
optimal response to the policy, regardless of the cutoff level of pollution. This will be the unique
optimal response, when the cutoff level of pollution is set below the target level. If the threat
cannot be imposed instantaneously or retroactively, then voluntary cost-minimizing abatement is
still the unique optimal response provided the cutoff level is set sufficiently low, i.e., at a level
that ensures that the present value of the stream of tax payments the farmer would face if the tax
is imposed exceeds the one-period cost savings he would enjoy by not meeting the target
voluntarily.
When the policy is applied to a group of farmers, cost-minimizing abatement is a Nash
equilibrium for any choice of the cutoff level. However, with multiple farmers the voluntary
cost-minimizing equilibrium is never unique. The nature of the other possible equilibria depends
on the relative magnitudes of the target and cutoff levels of pollution. If the cutoff level is set
less than the target level, then the combined approach will also yield Nash equilibria under
which the target is met voluntarily but some farmers free ride, i.e., abate less than they would at
the cost-minimizing allocation, implying an inefficient allocation of abatement across farmers.
In this case, to evaluate the overall efficiency of the combined approach, the loss from free-

23

riding under this approach would have to be weighed against any gain from an increase in
effectiveness relative to a purely voluntary approach or against any reduction in information
costs relative to a pure ambient tax policy.
It is possible to eliminate free-riding and ensure that cost-minimizing abatement is the
only Nash equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily by setting the cutoff level of
pollution equal to the target level. In this case, farmers have no incentive to free ride. The
potential for free riding occurs when the farmer must pay positive tax payments if the ambient
tax is imposed but avoids these costs if the target is met voluntarily. This net gain (in the form
of avoided tax payments) from meeting the target voluntarily makes some firms willing to abate
more under voluntary compliance than they would have abated under the tax, which in turn
allows other firms to abate less, i.e., to free ride. This possibility is eliminated if in equilibrium
net tax payments are zero, as they would be if the target and cutoff levels of pollution are equal
(since in equilibrium the target is just met). However, in this case zero voluntary abatement is
also a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium under which the target is met voluntarily no longer
strictly dominates the equilibrium under which it is not.18 When tax payments are zero in
equilibrium, the farmer will incur the same total cost regardless of whether the target is met
voluntarily or met as a result of imposition of the ambient tax. In either case, he incurs only the
cost of abatement. Thus, while it is still possible that farmers would choose to meet the target
voluntarily, they would not have a strict preference for doing so.
The above results suggest a potential efficiency tradeoff in the choice of the policy
parameters when the combined policy is applied to a group of farmers. The regulator can
increase the likelihood that the voluntary approach will be effective (and hence that the potential
savings in information or transaction costs will be realized) by setting the cutoff level of
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pollution below the target level. The lower the cutoff level is set, the higher are the tax payments
the farmer would have to make if the target is not met voluntarily. Thus, lowering the cutoff
level increases the severity of the threat and hence increases the incentive for the farmer(s) to
meet the target voluntarily. This holds for both the single and the multiple farmer cases.
However, when the policy is applied to a group of farmers, lowering the cutoff level has an
additional effect, namely, it also increases the potential for free-riding. Although voluntary costminimizing abatement is a Nash equilibrium regardless of the cutoff level of pollution, lowering
the cutoff level expands the set of Nash equilibria and hence increases the possibility that an
equilibrium that is not cost-minimizing will emerge. When applied to a group of farmers, an
optimal policy design would need to balance these two efficiency effects.
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Fig. 1. Farmer’s Total Cost under the Combined Policy
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Case a: x < xs

a2

x( a1 , a2 ) = xs
a2max

A

C (a1 ,q1 ) + C (a2 ,q 2 ) = C1* + C2*
NE where standard
is met voluntarily

a2*
B
a1*

a1max

a1

Case b: x = xs

a2

x( a1 , a2 ) = xs
C (a1 ,q1 ) + C (a2 ,q 2 ) = C1* + C2*
a2* = a2max

A

NE where standard
is met voluntarily

a1* = a1max

a1

Fig. 2. The Cut-off Level of Pollution and the Tradeoff Between Creating Incentives for
Voluntary Abatement and Inducing Free-Rider Problems
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Footnotes
1

Recent discussions of reauthorization of the Clean Water Act, for example, have focused on the control
of NPP. A notable example of nonpoint source pollution (NPP) is the contamination of surface water
from the runoff of agricultural chemicals. In many locations agriculture has been identified as the largest
source of NPP. Hence, much of the literature on NPP is in the context of agricultural water pollution.
For an overview of issues relating to nonpoint source pollution from agriculture, see Braden and
Segerson (1993) and Tomasi, Segerson and Braden (1994).

2

For discussions of the use of subsidies to reduce agricultural sources of water pollution, see Braden
and Lovejoy (1990), Norton et al. (1994), Lohr and Park (1995), Bosch et al. (1995), Wu and
Babcock (1995), Hardie and Parks (1996), Wiebe et al. (1996), Wu and Babcock (1996), Babcock et
al. (1996), Cooper and Keim (1996), Ribaudo and Caswell (1997), Ogg and Kuch (1997).

3

Henceforth, we use the term "mandatory controls" to refer both to mandatory regulations or
restrictions and tax-based policies such as ambient taxes or input taxes.

4

It is well-recognized that actual water quality will depend on a and θ as well as on other random
variables such as weather (e.g., Segerson, 1988). The expected level of water quality then depends
on the distribution of the weather variable. However, since we state the policy goal as one of
meeting a water quality standard on average over some period rather than at every instant in time, the
daily variability attributable to weather is not a key part of the analysis. Thus, for simplicity of
notation, we suppress the weather variable. Note, however, that when compliance with the target is
determined on a continuing basis, i.e., at every point in time, rather than on average over a period of
time, the existence of weather variability affects the efficiency properties of alternative policy
instruments. For example, with weather variability and continual determination of compliance, a
pure ambient tax would not induce first-best abatement. See Spraggon (2002) for a useful summary.

5

For some abatement practices such as installation of manure storage facilities, the abatement cost
may depend on only the abatement practice.
6

This is in contrast to the model in Segerson and Miceli (1998), where the level of environmental quality
under the voluntary approach is determined endogenously as a result of bargaining between the regulator
and the firm.

We do not consider the case where x > x s , which would imply that the farmer receives net
payments for meeting the standard. In this case, the farmer would never find it optimal to meet the
standard voluntarily.
7

8

It is also similar to a negligence rule in tort law, under which an injurer is liable for damages if the
level of care he undertook in conducting an activity is below the “due standard of care” but not liable
if he met the standard of care. See Shavell (1987) for a discussion of the economics of negligence
rules.
9

Given that the tax/subsidy policy in Segerson (1988) is based on actual pollution at each point in
time, which fluctuates as a result of random factors such as weather, the use of the subsidy when
pollution is below the target ensures efficient incentives. However, depending on the value of x , it
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is possible that under the pure tax/subsidy approach, in equilibrium the farmer will choose an
abatement vector such that on average the target is just met. In this case, on average no tax/subsidy
payments occur in equilibrium and the equilibrium outcome under the pure tax/subsidy policy is
identical to the outcome under a successful voluntary approach.
10

Segerson and Miceli (1998) derive a similar conclusion in the context of their model of point
source pollution. In their context, where the regulator and polluter bargain over the level of
voluntary abatement, this incentive creates the possibility of “over-compliance”, i.e., adoption of an
abatement level that exceeds the level that would have been induced under the regulator’s threat.
11

This is, of course, consistent with the Folk Theorem, a well-known result from the theory of
infinitely repeated games.
12

This is a reasonable assumption in a small watershed where farmers are neighbors. Our results
would, however, hold even if each farmer knew only the distribution of types across the other
farmers. In other words, it is not necessary for each farmer to know the types of specific farms in the
watershed, but only to know the distribution of the types of farms that comprise the watershed.
13

Given the assumption of an abatement index, cost minimization simply requires that abatement be
allocated efficiently across farms. With an abatement vector for each farm, cost minimization would
require efficient abatement allocation both across and within farms.
14

See Segerson (1988). Note that since this is an ambient tax the tax rate would be the same for all
farmers, even though farmers are not identical.
15

A similar free rider problem arises in the model of point source pollution developed by Dawson
and Segerson (2002), where the regulator threatens to impose an emissions tax on an industry if it
does not meet an exogenous emissions target. As in the model here, free riding generates an
inefficiency because abatement is allocated inefficiently across firms. However, Segerson and
Dawson (2001) show that, despite this inefficiency, the voluntary approach will still be more efficient
if the regulator threatens imposition of a costly (inefficient) regulation rather than an emissions tax.
Even under the threat of a tax, the voluntary approach may still be more efficient, if the welfare loss
associated with the inefficient allocation of abatement across firms is less than the information or
other transaction costs required for implementation of the tax.
16

See references in footnote 2.

17

Proofs are analogous and will be provided upon request.

18

Zero voluntary abatement can also be a Nash equilibrium when the cutoff level is below the target
level. However, in these cases the Nash equilibria with voluntary abatement strictly dominate the
zero voluntary abatement equilibria.
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